# Negative Constructives

## Constructive 1

**According the National Taxpayers Union: "Working for money. To most, this is common sense**, but to the president it is unacceptable to make anyone work for OTHER people’s tax dollars; they should be simply have the money handed to them. **If money is handed to you, where is the incentive to work? There is no incentive, which is why those on welfare never got off of it until they actually had to start working.** It may seem so simple to the average American, but apparently there are some in Washington who need an Econ 101 class refresher". **Giving charity to the poor is pointless, it doesn't help them get out of where they are, it teaches them that all they have to do get money is sit there and let people give it to them.**

**It is because I agree with the NTU, that I negate today's resolution. I will prove that individuals are not morally obligated to assist people in need.**

**To clarify the round I would like to define the following terms.**

**Assist**

**Google**

**an act of helping, typically by providing money.**

**The resolution asks whether or not people have moral obligation Therefore, when it comes to the resolution asking about people being obligated to distribute their possessions to those who are in need of them, I value Distributive Justice.**

#### Distributive Justice - When everyone is entitled to what they have

**Nozick, 76**

**The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess in the distribution.**

**The best criterion for determining Distributive Justice is Upholding the Entitlement Theory which is an historical principle of justice.**

Nosick, 76 (2)

The general outlines of the entitlement theory illuminate the nature and effects of other conceptions of distributive justice. **The entitlement theory of justice in distribution is historical; whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about. In contrast, current time slice principle of justice hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principles of just distribution**. A utilitarian, who judges between any 2 distributions by seeing which has the greater sum of utility and, if the sums tie, applies some fixed equality criterion to choose the more equal distribution, would hold a current time-slice principle of justice. As would someone who had a fixed schedule of trade-offs between the sum of happiness and equality. According to a current time-slice principle, all that needs to be looked at, in judging the justice of a distribution, is who ends up with what; in comparing any 2 distributions one need only look at the matrix by presenting the distributions. No further information need be fed into a principle justice. It is a consequence of such principles of justice that any 2 structurally identical distributions are equally just. (2 distributions are structurally identical if they present the same profile, but perhaps have different persons occupying the particular slots. My having 10 and your having 5, and my having 5 and your having 10 are structurally identical distributions.) Welfare economics is the theory of current time-slice principles of justice. The subject is conceived as operating on matrices representing only current information about distribution. This, as well as some of the usual (for example, the choice of distribution is invariant under relabeling of columns), guarantees that welfare economics will be a current time-slice theory, with all of its inadequacies

**As entitlement theory is the determination of whether people are entitled to their holdings or not, therefore it is the most effective way to determine whether or not distributive justice has been upheld.**

**Contention 1 -**

**Even the poorest people can support themselves and their families, they simply choose not to.**

#### Its not like the poor don't have money, they don't use it right.

**Kristof 10,**

It’s that **if the poorest families spent as much money educating their children as they do on wine, cigarettes and prostitutes, their children’s prospects would be transformed**. Much **suffering is caused not only by low incomes, but also by shortsighted private spending decisions by heads of households.**

**This means that even if we were to give these people money to help themselves lift themselves out of poverty, they would simply spend it on things like liqour and cigarretes. Therefore there is no reason to give them money that we have worked for, simply for them to enjoy with it**

**Contention 2 -**

**If one is obligated in giving up ones holdings the transfer would cause a violation of the entitlement theory**

#### People being obligated to give their holdings to another violates entitlement theory

**Nozick, 76**

Another view which might lead to support for a more extensive state holds that **people have a right to a say in the decisions that importantly affect their lives**. (It would then be argued that a more extensive government is needed to realize this right and is one of the institutional forms through which this right is to be exercised.) **The entitlement conception would examine the means whereby people's lives are importantly affected. Some ways of importantly affecting their lives violate (rights of the sort Locke would admit) and hence are morally forbidden; for example killing the person, chopping off his arm. Other ways of importantly affecting the lives of others are within the rights of the affecter.** If 4 men propose marriage to a women her decision about whom, if any of them, to marry importantly affects each of the lives of these 4 persons, her own life and the lives of any other persons wishing to marry one of those 4 men, and so on. Would anyone propose, even limiting the group to include only the primary party, that all 5 persons vote to decide whom she shall marry?

**The implication of this is that if people were involuntarily forced by the will of others to make decisions then entitlement theory would no longer be upheld and therefore obligatory charity would no longer be a just action. This relates to the resolution because the affecter is the donor and therefore they have the right to determine whether or not they wish to affect the "person in need".**

## Constructive 2

**I negate the resolution resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.**

I offer the following definitions to clarify the round

Wordnet 11’ defines Freedom as

("Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011. Web. 10 Jul 2011.

http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=freedom)

the condition of being free; the power to act or speak or think without externally imposed restrains.

Callahan, 13 writes,

(Daniel Callahan, Senior Research Scholar and President Emeritus of the Center, Senior Lecturer at the Harvard Medical School and is now a Senior Scholar at Yale. He received his B.A. from Yale and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard.10/1986, A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, The Hastings Center, Vol. 14, No. 5, Autonomy, Paternalism, and Community, Date Accessed- 7/21/2013)

A major attraction of the concept of autonomy is that it helps to establish(es) moral independence. Not only does it entail that, as an individual, I am to be treated by others as a moral end rather than a moral means, it also requires that they allow me to pursue my own moral goods. Autonomy can thus be understood as [is] the basis for moral enfranchisement, establishing my standing as an equal in the community and my liberty to pursue my own ends. In the context of medicine, it is a value that has served to establish the rights of patients over physicians, and the right to be spared the paternalistic interventions of those who think they understand my welfare better than I do. The purpose of autonomy is to make me my own moral master. But if autonomy may serve me in some fundamental ways, what would it be like to live in a community for which autonomy was the central value? What kind of a medical practice might emerge with patient autonomy as the sole goal? Let me try to answer that question by first reviewing some of the benefits of giving moral priority to autonomy. Among them are recognition of the rights of individuals and of their personal dignity; the erection of a powerful bulwark against moral and political despotism; a becoming humility about the sources or certainty of moral claims and demands; and a foundation for the protection of unpopular people and causes against majoritarian domination. Those are powerful benefits, to be meddled with only at our peril. Nonetheless, I believe that if autonomy is made the moral goal of a society, or of medical care within that society, then we are equally at peril in our common life together.

### My value for the round is Freedom.

Freedom is a prerequisite to individuals having any individual power whatsoever. To determine what obligations an individual has, they must first be considered free actors, otherwise any agency is removed from the question and the discussion of moral obligation of individual action is gone.

**My criterion for the round is Upholding Autonomy**

Callahan, 13 writes,

(Daniel Callahan, Senior Research Scholar and President Emeritus of the Center, Senior Lecturer at the Harvard Medical School and is now a Senior Scholar at Yale. He received his B.A. from Yale and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard.10/1986, A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, The Hastings Center, Vol. 14, No. 5, Autonomy, Paternalism, and Community, Date Accessed- 7/21/2013)

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Upholding autonomy comes before \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ because according

to autonomy you decide your own morals.

#### C1: Individuals do not have a moral obligation to assist others.

#### A. While it is commendable to assist the distant needy, people are not morally obligated to do so; it is unneeded

Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009

<http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65-e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111>

Although it is the last in the listing of the principles that under pin the society of peoples, the duty of assistance is very important to Rawl’s internationalism. As stated in the earlier part of this work, it is the only principle that shows that the society of peoples owes anything at all to the distant other in the sense of positive action to bring the peoples in the burdened societies out of their problems. Laudable as this principle might have otherwise been, its central defect lies in the supererogatory implication. The principle grants a duty that does not morally obligate society of peoples to help the **distant** needy in those burdened societies. What it allows to get to those needy peoples is just humanitarian services. Thus , the recipients of the assistance from the society of peoples are deprived of any moral right to make a morally binding demand on the society of people if they fail to fulfill this duty of assistance.

Although people in need may indeed have a right to receive aid, there is no obligation for individuals to give that aid. Even though this seems somewhat contradictory, it is a question of moral obligation for separate individuals and groups. People assisting those in need is laudable, it is not required.

#### C2: Individuals should judge what they deem to be morally right and then act accordingly

Larry Krasnoff, Professor of Philosophy at College of Charleston South Carolina, October 2010

<http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQSUPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object>

Of course we ought to do what we judge to be good, and of course we ought to do it because of its goodness. The model here is one of recognition, drawn without fundamental alteration from the case of belief. Certainly we ought to exercise our autonomous judgment about what to believe, but just as certainly we ought to believe what we judge to be true, independently of anything about ourselves. In the theoretical case, our thoughts are necessarily directed towards objects beyond ourselves, and so the role of our will must be to subordinate itself to our best judgments about the nature of the object.

Moral obligations must be the results of our reasoning and judgments. If that happens to coincide with the reasoning and judgments of everyone else in the world, then of course we should do what we deem to be good. But it is a decision that must be arrived at from within, not an externally advocated obligation.

#### Moral obligation results from contractarianism

The [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html) states contractarianism

Contractarianism, which stems from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought, **holds that persons are primarily self-interested, and that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead them to act morally** (where the moral norms are determined by the maximization of joint interest) and to consent to governmental authority.

(Olufemu Badru, Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009

http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65-e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111)

In other words, from the foregoing, the point is that while obligation results from contract-like relations or simply contractarianism between the self and the other, duty results from the fact of occupying a position of responsibility**;** duty is a certain job of value expected of a person who occupies the position.

Moral obligations do not arise from people earning or losing certain rights. The difference between duty and obligation is that duty is something expected of a person because of who they are or what they are capable of doing. Obligation is a relationship between a person and another, based on the nature that they are both people.

## Constructive 3

**Negative Case**

“*The man who does not value himself, cannot value anything or anyone.*” This quotation from Ayn Rand in her book, *The Virtue of Selfishness* explains that the one should value and help themselves before they value and help others. It is because I agree with this quotation that I negate the resolution: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need. Before I begin, I would like to define

***The Individual*** (Dictionary.com): A single human being, distinguished from a group.

***Assist*** (Merriam-Webster): To give support or aid to; to help

(above 2 already defined the same by aff)

***Moral Obligation*** as defined by Waluchow

Will Waluchow, Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (book) It is defined as:

a duty that is based only on one’s conscience and that is not legally enforceable

#### Observation 1 (Moral nihilism):

Alan **Pratt**, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, **2011**

also known as ethical nihilism, is the [meta-ethical](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta-ethics) view that **morality does not exist as something inherent to objective reality; therefore no action is necessarily preferable to any other.** This concept can be backed up by a quotation from philosopher Nietzsche which states “You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way, the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist.” I value ethical egoism because it is the individual that knows the best, on an intimate level about his or her wants and needs. Therefore, the best and most accurate help one may receive is from his or her self. The idea of ethical egoism can be explained by Steven Sanders’ book “Is egoism morally defensibly?” as “Ethical egoism is **the** [normative ethical](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normative_ethics) **position that** [moral agents](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_agency) **ought to do what is in their own** [self-interest](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-interest)**.** It differs from [psychological egoism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_egoism), which claims that [people](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People) can only act in their self-interest.Ethical egoism also differs from [rational egoism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_egoism), which holds that it is [rational](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationality) to act in one's self-interest.

My value-criterion is enforcing the idealogy of Nietzsche, a philosopher. He believed that the main goal of humanity is to become self-reliant. His beliefs go further to state that only through self-reliance can one become stronger.

#### Contention 1: Helping people only denies them the suffering that would make them stronger.

A famous quote from Nietzsche states “That which does not kill us makes us stronger.” This means that through suffering, one gains strength in the long-term.

One such example that relates to this quotation is how the US has sent significant monetary aid to many African States ($600 Billion)

**Andrews**, Journalist, Foreign Aid and development in Africa: What the literature says and what the reality is **2009**,<http://www.academia.edu/202805/Foreign_aid_and_development_in_Africa_What_the_literature_says_and_what_the_reality_is>)

“**The growing gap between the developed and developing countries** has dominated international relations and diplomacy for a long time. This gap **has led to constant capital inflow from the developed countries to those in the Third World including Africa, with the goal of helping them** overcome their problems and **reduce the gap. However,** there is evidence that **decades of foreign aid have done little in changing the destinies of many African states, most of which are currently experiencing low growth rates.**”

Despite all the aid sent to these African states, they are still developing at extremely slow rates. This is the result of all the aid, which has not allowed the African states to gain the strength that is developed through self-reliance.

#### Contention 2: The moral obligation to assist others is strictly limited to not causing harm to ourselves.

**BBC** (Singer), “A Duty to Give” **2008**, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/duty\_1.shtml

Peter Singer separates preventing evil from promoting good and contends **“if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”**

However, Slote argues that **“one has an obligation to prevent serious evil or harm** *when one can do so without seriously interfering with one’s life plans or style* **and without doing any wrongs of commission**”.

To further elaborate, there is no call for people to give in a way that will negatively affect them. Because they are not obligated to give anything, there is no way to claim any specific “appropriate” amount. For a person to give beyond their means or to negatively affect their ability to give in the future would be counterproductive to the very nature of aid. **So, my opponent’s argument, that we should assist others in need, does not always apply, and in fact only applies in extremely limited cases.**

#### Contention 3: Individuals should judge what they themselves deem morally right and act accordingly.

Krasnoff, Professor of Philosophy at College of Charleston South Carolina, October 2010, http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQSUPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object

Of course we **ought to do what we judge to be good**, and of course we ought to do it **because of its goodness**. The model here is one of recognition, drawn without fundamental alteration from the case of belief. **Certainly we ought to exercise our autonomous judgment about what to believe**, but **just as certainly we ought to believe what we judge to be true, independently of anything about ourselves.** **In the theoretical case, our thoughts are necessarily directed towards objects beyond ourselves, and so the role of our will must be to subordinate itself to our best judgments** about the nature of the object.

In this particular case, if all individuals have a moral obligation to assist others in need, then they are being denied the right to act autonomously and through their own judgment, hence limiting their everyday freedom, a basic human right. There is no such thing as a moral obligation in our culture, so it must be determined on an individual basis. Moral obligations must be the results of our reasoning and judgments.  If that happens to coincide with the reasoning and judgments of everyone else in the world, then of course we should do what we deem to be good.  But it is a decision that must be arrived at from within, not an externally advocated obligation.

## Constructive 4

Negative Rough Draft

I negate today’s resolution, and will prove that individuals do *not* have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

To clarify some points I would like to define a term:

Need is defined by Merriam Webster as a condition requiring supply or relief.

In this debate I value morality

**Gert, 2012 defines morality as**

(Bernard, Jul 21, Professor of Philosophy at Dartmouth College “The Definition of Morality”,

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/#Bib>)

descriptively to refer to some **codes of conduct put forward by a society**

In order to support the value of morality, I provide the criterion of upholding Ethical Egoism, which is defined by

**Shaver, 2010** (Robert, Egoism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/)

Ethical egoism claims that **it is** necessary and **sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest**. (There are possibilities other than maximization. One might, for example, claim that one ought to achieve a certain level of welfare, but that there is no requirement to achieve more. Ethical egoism might also apply to things other than acts, such as rules or character traits. Since these variants are uncommon, and the arguments for and against them are largely the same as those concerning the standard version, I set them aside.)

Contention 1:

#### Assisting those in need can sometimes have adverse affects on the ones getting the assistance, an example of this is of giving aid to foreign countries causing dependency.

**BBC, 2014** ( Advantages and Disadvantages of Aid, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/development/aid\_rev2.shtml)

**Aid can increase the dependency** of LEDCs **on donor countries. Sometimes aid is not a gift**, but a loan, and poor countries may struggle to repay.

#### An example of a country become aid dependant is Cambodia

**Godfrey, 02** (Martin, Chan Sophal, Toshiyasu Kato, Long Vou

Piseth, Pon Dorina, Tep Saravay, Tia Savora, Cambodia development researchers, World Development, Google Scholar)

**Cambodia is aid-dependant** in the sense that **external aid is so big**, **in relation to GNP, export earnings and, particularly, government revenue, that it distorts the economy and the government’s response to economic problems**. To what extent can technical assistance (TA) develop local capacity in a situation of this kind? This paper attempts to answer this question on the basis of research carried out by Cambodia Development Resource Institute in 1998-99 .The research undertaken between September 1998 and November 1999 involved: analysis of data from the official aid coordination agency; interviewswith32donor/NGOagencyheads, 11 senior government officials, and many more consultations; a tracer study of 49 former counterparts in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and interviews with 56 still working in ministries; collection ofPaterson, Ok Serei Sopheak, M.S. Shivakumar, Mal Simmons, Ad Spijkers, Charles Vanpraet, Dennis West and Rob Williams, participants at a workshop in Phnom Penh in March 2000, and three anonymous referees. Donor agency heads and staff, government officials, counterparts, project team leaders and staff and other informants supported the research by gen- erous provision of time and information. The funding of various parts of the research by the UN Resident Coordinator System, Ausaid, WHO/Ministry of Health and, through its grant to CDRI, Sida, is also gratefully acknowledged. Final revision accepted: 8 October 2001.355356 WORLD DEVELOPMENTstatistical information from and interviews in 50 projects (with team leaders, Cambodian staff and counterparts) in economic management, education, health, agriculture and rural devel- opment; institutional case studies of the School of Agriculture at Prek Leap, the National In- stitute of Management and the National Insti- tute of Statistics; and a study of the health sector, including a case study of HIV/AIDS and malaria programs, with particular reference to Battambang province.A useful operational definition of capacity development is ‘‘the process by which individ- uals, organizations, institutions and societies develop abilities (individually and collectively) to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives.’’ This process has four interrelated dimensions: the development of individual skills, and the conditions needed to ensure that they are used productively; the de- velopment of effective organizations or entities (such as public bodies, private businesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or community based groups) within which indi- viduals can work; strengthening of interrela- tionships between entities (e.g., a micro-credit system consisting of credit institutions, line ministries, NGOs, small businesses and com- munity-based groups); and an enabling envi- ronment for addressing cross-sectoral issues relevant to all parts of society (UNDP, 1997, p. 3). The definition used in this article en- compasses all four of these dimensions, with particular emphasis on developing the capacity of ‘‘counterparts,’’ in government departments or other local organizations, to continue with similar work after a donor agency has with- drawn its funding. Individual capacity devel- opment alone is clearly not enough for this purpose: the other three dimensions of the process must also be addressed. The focus is on potential substitutes for the external agencies (rather than, say, on village development committees, primary school teachers or health care assistants, the development of whose ca- pacity is the worthy output of many projects)— in other words, on the extent to which TA is developing the capacity to replace itself.This is not, of course, the only criterion that could be used to assess the impact of TA, which has many purposes. For instance, an immediate objective of some TA (in the eyes of both do- nors and recipients) is to facilitate resource flows: this includes the preparation of feasibil- ity studies, project proposals, presentations for meetings with donors, and evaluations, and theplanning and implementation of capital pro- jects. Another is to monitor and supervise such resource flows: some donors prefer to retain these functions in their own hands. There may be a tradeoff between these immediate objec- tives and that of capacity development. The quality of the documents prepared for facilita- tion of resource flows may be higher, and the time taken to prepare them shorter, if the task is performed by an international ‘‘expert’’ than if counterparts take primary responsibility. In addition, there may be risks involved in hand- ing over supervision of resource flows entirely to relatively inexperienced and not particularly well paid counterparts.In a sense, also, the ultimate objective of all TA, as of external assistance in general, is to increase output and incomes in the recipient economy. Here again a tradeoff may arise: for instance, an adviser who gives good advice di- rectly to a Finance Minister may have a quicker and surer impact on policy (and hence on out- put and incomes) than one who concentrates on developing the capacity of counterparts to give such advice. One experienced adviser (Gray, 1997, p. 416) has protested that it is a ‘‘fallacy’’ to treat ‘‘capacity building by implication as the exclusive goal of technical assistance.’’ In the case of policy analysis and implementation, for instance, he argues that occasions may arise on which ‘‘the net present value (NPV) of an ad- visor’s direct intervention . . . is greater than the NPV of delaying the intervention in order to associate local technicians with the process.’’ It is even conceivable that the cost of erosion of government agencies by such donor-driven substitute TA may be less than the immediate benefits of the projects in question.

There may, then, be circumstances in which the intermediate objective of capacity develop- ment has to be sacrificed to the immediate and ultimate objectives. If capacity development does not take place, however, then the resource flows that have been facilitated, monitored and supervised will have no lasting effect on output and incomes and TA will eventually have failed on all three counts. As a World Bank Vice- President has put it, ‘‘whether or not you are building capacity at the national level is the only way that you can ultimately judge [if] what you are doing in the area of technical assistance makes sense’’ (Jaycox, 1995, p. 23).

In his classic critique of capacity develop- ment via TA, Berg (1993, p. 246) emphasizes the ‘‘donor- or supply-driven nature of techni- cal [assistance] which has led to excessive use,TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 357

inefficient allocation, weak local ownership and hence limited commitment.’’ This, he suggests, contributes to disorderly decision making, deepens dependence on foreign experts and relieves local staff of responsibility, weakening rather than building local institutions and ca- pacities. ‘‘Ownership’’ is a subtle concept, since it is located in the minds of recipients. It is not the same thing as passive acceptance or com- mitment. As van de Walle and Johnston (1996, p. 54) put it, ‘‘recipient governments can be said to ‘own’ an aid activity when they believe that it empowers them and serves their interests.’’ This means, as far as government ownership is concerned, that formal indicators such as the extent to which government plays an active role in design and implementation and makes available counterparts of adequate quality, and to which projects are implemented through normal government structures, while relevant, are not enough. Judgement is also needed on the extent to which such ownership is real.

Both government ownership and capacity development are related to a government’s fi- nancial situation—whether it raises enough revenue to pay a living wage to officials, and to continue activities started by projects, after do- nors have withdrawn. Berg (1993, p. 246) draws attention to the ‘‘poor incentives and working conditions in recipient country public sectors, which lead to low local staff job motivation and high turnover, creating a . . .. work environment in which capacity-building and institutional- development efforts fail to take hold.’’ The World Bank’s recent review of aid (World Bank, 1998, p. 88) points out that benefits from projects ‘‘will flow only if there are adequate incentives for (mainly civil service) providers: . . . underpaid (but not especially overworked) and with their morale at rock bottom, civil servants, especially high-level ones, have turned to moonlighting and corruption.’’ Such financial problems are particularly acute in countries which are poor and aid-dependent.

Aid dependence can be measured in various ways—in relation to a recipient country’s out- put, exports, foreign investment, government revenue and expenditure, etc. If aid is large in relation to GNP and export earnings, it may give rise to a form of ‘‘Dutch disease.’’ Dutch disease was the name given, following the ex- perience of the Netherlands in the 1970s with expansion of its natural gas production, to the negative impact of a windfall increase in foreign exchange earnings from a particular source (usually mineral exports) on the rest of aneconomy (see Davis, 1995; Fardmanesh, 1991; Usui, 1996). The disease has two aspects: the ‘‘resource movement effect’’ and the ‘‘spending effect.’’ The expansion of the booming sector pulls factors of production toward it and bids up their prices, and as a result other tradable sectors become less profitable and contract: this is the resource movement effect. Insofar as ex- tra income arising from the booming sector is spent on nontradable goods, this bids up the prices of such goods relative to those of tra- dable goods, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This exchange rate appre- ciation makes these tradable sectors less com- petitive in international and domestic markets and they contract further: this is the spending effect. Although usually linked to mineral booms, the Dutch disease, it has been sug- gested, can also be transmitted through mas- sive, ‘‘windfall,’’ aid inflows (e.g., see Younger, 1992 on Ghana, and White & Wignaraja, 1992 on Sri Lanka).Knack (2000) goes further and suggests that **aid can also** transmit what he calls the ‘‘Zairean disease,’’ **{cause}worsening {of)the quality of government institutions,** by among other things reducing government dependence on its citizens for tax revenue. Cassen and Associates (1986), re- viewing research in the 1970s and 1980s, had found little evidence to support the hypothesis that recipient governments systematically use aid to reduce their tax-gathering efforts. But econometricians are still grappling with this question (e.g., Azam, Devarajan, & O’Connell, 1999; Khan & Hoshino, 1992; McGillivray, 1994). Other elements of this aid-related disease include weakening state bureaucracies by si- phoning off scarce talent (similar to the resource movement effect of the Dutch disease) and hindering the development of administrative capacity by implementing projects that gov- ernments would have otherwise undertaken.

In the above example aid negatively affects the countries economy and the quality of government institutions, many government institutions save lives (ie police force, firefighters) and the worsening of quality means there will be more deaths. This means that assisting is not always the moral thing to do, even if there is need, because of the adverse effects that come to the ones being assisted.

#### Contention 2:

#### Always doing what is moral destroys our ability to have genuine projects and relationships

**Murphy, 1993** (Liam B. Murphy, Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at  the New York University School of Law, Google Scholar)

The general idea behind the "alienation objection" is that **impartial**

**morality makes various demands on our motivations that are incompatible**

**with the motivations necessary for fully valuable personal projects and**

**relationships**. One influential claim is that if **we can only have projects and relationships when morality "gives" them to us** (by saying that they are morally permissible, or that they would bring about the best outcome), then **we will not be able to see our projects and relationships as having intrinsic value, and as a result will not be able to have genuine projects and relationships at all.**

This means that if everyone fulfills their moral obligation and no one chooses whether or not to assist those in need then we cannot value it when people do, and if we cannot value people doing what is morally right then we cannot have relationships with others because we cannot judge them.

**Now on the AC the aff states that individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need, and my response is that humans never truly act selflessly**,

**Hobbes, 1651** (Thomas, Philosopher, Leviathan)

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free gift; and is the fourth law of nature, which may be conceived in this form: that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace endeavour that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For **no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good**; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and hath the same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation by covenant

This means that the affirmative is arguing for an idea that cannot truly exist, and disproves utilitarianism.

Further proving that individuals do not have a moral obligation to assist people that are in need, and therefore the resolution is proven false, Thank You

## Constructive 5

(Alice H. Eagly, Maureen Crowley, Purdue University, 1986, Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Social Psychological Literature, http://psy.haifa.ac.il/~ep/Students\_Post/Projects/Project\_2/2009-10/gender%20and%20helping%20behavior.pdf) From a social-role perspective, sex differences in **helping behavior should be highly variable because helping is embedded in social roles and is therefore regulated by a variety of social norms. Consequently, it is not reasonable to predict** that either men or women are uniformly the more helpful sex, **provided that helping has been studied with methods representative of natural settings.** Instead, the size and direction of sex differ- ences should be a product of situational variables that determine what social roles are salient in particular situations.

It is because I agree with Alice H. Eagly and Maureen Crowley that I negate today’s resolution. I will prove that Individuals do *not* have a moral obligation to assist people in need. To clarify the round, I would like to define the following terms:

**Erik Carlson defined morality in ‘02 as** (ERIK CARLSON, DELIBERATION, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND MORALITY AS A GUIDE TO ACTION, 2002 *Kluwer Academic Publishers, http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/96/art%253A10.1023%252FA%253A1020146102680.pdf?auth66=1406229185\_dc5edf73731c99853b808baebb2a3da8&ext=.pdf*) It is often maintained that morality is **essentially “action-guiding”.** This claim may mean different things. Sometimes, it expresses the idea that moral considerations are able to “motivate people to act in certain ways or at least to provide them with reasons to act in those ways”.2 Other philosophers have a weaker claim in mind. In this weaker sense, a **moral theory is action-guiding if it tells an agent how to act, given that she is motivated (and has reasons) to act morally.** This is the sense of “action- guiding” I shall be concerned with. Many believe that an acceptable moral theory, i.e., a criterion of rightness, must be action-guiding in this sense. There are several considerations that speak in favour of this requirement. Without the requirement of action-guidance, the normative properties of rightness and wrongness would tend to seem superfluous. If the purpose of a moral theory is only to evaluate or classify actions, we could do with *evaluative* properties, like goodness and badness. Whereas these evaluative properties can meaningfully be ascribed to a wide variety of entities, the properties of rightness and wrongness primarily apply, as Holly Smith observes, to entities that can be *chosen* or *decided* upon, via voluntary actions.3 And, as Smith goes on to suggest, the reason why we need the normative properties is that “the criterion of rightness provides the kind of evaluation of choosable events which can form the basis for *guid- ing* choices with respect to those events. It is precisely because we need some standard of evaluation to serve this function that we have criteria of rightness in addition to criteria of goodness”.

**Carlos Molina-Jimenez, Santosh Shrivastava and John Warne of the School of Computing Schience stated in ‘05 that an obligation** (School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, A Method for Specifying Contract Mediated Interactions, Carlos Molina-Jimenez, Santosh Shrivastava and John Warne, June 2005, http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/publications/trs/papers/914.pdf) The challenge here is to find a convenient formal notation that captures all or at least the most important parameters present in most business conversations. Business contracts can be abstracted as a set of permissions (P), obligations (O) and prohibitions (F) that are expected to be fulfilled by actors (also called agents or role players) for the benefit of others by means of performing (or not performing) operations (also called actions). We define a *permission* as an action that an actor, for example a buyer or a seller, is allowed to perform; for instance, “The buyer is allowed to use his discretion to send a purchaser order to the seller” is a buyer’s permission for the benefit of the seller. Likewise, an *obligation* **is defined as an action that an actor is expected to perform**; an example of a seller’s obligation for the benefit of the buyer is “The seller is obliged to respond to the buyer within three days after the receipt of the purchase order”.

Hence, a moral obligation must be something that guides you to do a defined action that you are expected to perform.

The definition of assist is to give usually supplementary support or aid according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary.

#### And Dictionary.com defines Need as a lack of something requisite, desirable, or useful

Given the definition of need, a person IN need must be a person with the lack of something requisite, desirable, or useful. Individuals do not have a moral obligation to help others that are merely lacking something that they desire or deem useful. The implication that the affirmative is making is that we have a fundamental moral obligation to assist every person that is desiring something or that is lacking something that could be useful. This means that, since it is human nature to always desire more, everyone will be a person “in need”. If that was the case, there would be nobody to help those in need. Therefore, I value the theory of Ethical Egoism.

**Rachels ‘93**§ (An american ethics philosopher from the university of Alabama named James Rachels, 1993, http://www.upscsuccess.com/sites/default/files/documents/Ethical\_Theory\_An\_Anthology\_@nadal.pdf#page=211)

Some **thinkers** have **maintain**ed that, in fact, **[the thought that] we have no "natural" duties to other people. Ethical Egoism is the idea that each person ought to pursue his or her own self- interest exclusively.** It is different from Psychological Egoism, which is a theory of human nature concerned with how people do behave—Psychological Egoism says that people do in fact always pursue their own interests. **Ethical Egoism,** by contrast, **is a** normative theory—that is, a **theory about how we ought to behave.** Regardless of how we do behave, Ethical Egoism **[it] says we have no moral duty except to do what is best for *ourselves.*** It is a challenging theory. It contradicts some of our deepest moral beliefs—beliefs held by most of us, at any rate—but it is not easy to refute. We will examine the most important arguments for and against it. If it turns out to be true, then of course that is immensely important. But even if it turns out to be false, there is still much to be learned from examining it—we may, for example, gain some insight into the reasons why we do have obligations to other people. But before looking at the arguments, we should be a little clearer about exactly what this theory says and what it does not say. In the first place, Ethical Egoism does not say that one should promote one's own interests as well as the interests of others. That would be an ordinary, unexceptional view. **Ethical Egoism is the** radical **view that one's only duty is to promote one's own interests.** According to Ethical Egoism, **there is only one ultimate principle of conduct, the principle of self- interest, and this principle sums up all of one's natural duties and obligations.**

It is essential for us to be protecting our self-interests, our independences, and our liberties. Hence, the best criterion for my value is protecting autonomy.

#### Contention 1 - We know ourselves better than we know others, so it is easier and more efficient to help ourselves instead of only being able to *attempt* to help others.

**Rachels 2**§ (An american ethics philosopher from the university of Alabama named James Rachels, 1993, http://www.upscsuccess.com/sites/default/files/documents/Ethical\_Theory\_An\_Anthology\_@nadal.pdf#page=211)

**Each of us is** intimately **familiar with our own individual wants and needs. Moreover, each of us is uniquely placed to pursue those wants and needs effectively. At the same time, we know the desires and needs of other people only imperfectly, and we are not well situated to pursue them. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that if we set out to be "our brother's keeper," we would often bungle the job and end up doing more mischief than good.**

#### Contention 2 - Attempting to help people is an intrusion of privacy. Privacy is an unalienable right that should not be taken away from someone. But, by minding your own business and using the Ethical Egoism theory, nobody’s rights are taken away from them and everyone helps themselves.

**Rachels 3**§ (An american ethics philosopher from the university of Alabama named James Rachels, 1993, http://www.upscsuccess.com/sites/default/files/documents/Ethical\_Theory\_An\_Anthology\_@nadal.pdf#page=211)

At the same time, **the policy of "looking out for others" is an offensive intrusion into other people's privacy; it is essentially a policy of minding other people's business.**

**Regan ‘98** (Privacy Rights in the Information Economy, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and Public Policy by Priscilla Regan, Review by: Richard A. Spinello, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct., 1998), pp. 723-742, Published by: Philosophy, Documentation Center, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857550) Before addressing this complex question, we must briefly review the traditional arguments supporting **the value of privacy as an essential component of human development. Philosophers and legal scholars have consistently maintained that privacy is a necessity, a basic natural right, not just an ethical nicety or an expendable luxury.** Hence it is instructive to explore basic argument supporting this position.

#### Contention 3 - Treating people out of charity is demeaning to their pride, self-confidence, and self-esteem.    You may think that you are fulfilling your moral obligation by trying to help someone, but you might really be depleting any type of confidence or dignity that they have. But, if you care for your own self and you let those “in need” do so as well, their sense of self-esteem might even rise, since they helped themselves.

**Greg Schmidt and Bernard Weiner discovered in ‘88 that** (An Attribution-Affect-Action Theory of Behavior: Replications of Judgments of Help-Giving, Greg Schmidt and Bernard Weiner, Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1988) From the perspective of the attributional theory to be tested, **when a person is in need of aid, the potential helper attempts to determine why help is needed.** If the cause is perceived as uncontrollable, that is, **if the person in need is perceived as unable to help him-or herself, then pity(sympathy) is experienced** and help is offered. On the other hand, if the cause is perceived as controllable, then the person in need is responsible for his or her plight, anger is elicited and aid is withheld.

**Rachels 4**§ (An american ethics philosopher from the university of Alabama named James Rachels, 1993, http://www.upscsuccess.com/sites/default/files/documents/Ethical\_Theory\_An\_Anthology\_@nadal.pdf#page=211)

**Making other people the object of one's "charity" is degrading to them; it robs them of their individual dignity and self-respect. The offer of charity says**, in effect, **that they are not competent to care for themselves; and the statement is self-fulfilling—they cease to be self-reliant and become passively dependent on others. That is why the recipients of "charity" are so often resentful rather than appreciative. What this adds up to is that the policy of "looking out for others" is self-defeating. If we want to promote the best interests of everyone alike, we should *not* adopt so-called altruistic policies of behavior. On the contrary, if each person looks after his or her *own* interests, it is more likely that everyone will be better off, in terms of both physical and emotional well-being. Thus Robert G. Olson says in his book *The Morality of Self-interest* (1965), "The individual is most likely to contribute to social betterment by rationally pursuing his own best long-range interests." Or as Alexander Pope said more poetically,**

**Thus God and nature formed the general frame And bade self-love and social be the same.**

By affirming that we have a “moral obligation” to assist someone, it is very possible that natural rights could be harmed. But, if we act according to the theory of Ethical Egoism, everyone takes care of themselves. Hence, with my value, we can care for the person that we know best, ourselves, privacy is less likely to be intruded, and “charity” not likely to deplete the self confidence of those “in need” or make them passively dependent on anyone.

Therefore, I urge a negative ballot...

## Constructive 6

#### If the plan is true bad things will happen. Here is an example:

**Associated Press July 21, 2014** (Associated Press, “Boston Marathon suspect's friend guilty of impeding probe,” http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/21/boston-marathon-suspect-friend-guilty-impeding-probe/)

**Azamat Tazhayakov was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy, with prosecutors saying he agreed with a friend's plan to remove Tsarnaev's backpack containing altered fireworks from his dorm room a few days after the 2013 bombing (to help his friends get away with the bombing).**

In this case the bad thing happened to another person. Nonetheless, the plan is not true due to bad things happening because of one person helping another person.

#### Bad things will result from the plan if the plan is passed. Here is an example of that:

**Associated Press July 16, 2014** (Associated Press, “British citizen sentenced to more than 12 years in US for supporting Taliban in Afghanistan,” http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/16/british-citizen-sentenced-to-more-than-12-years-in-us-for-supporting-taliban-in/)

**A British citizen has been sentenced to more than 12 years in prison** by a judge who said he **[because he] supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan while it was protecting Osama bin Laden**…

Hall said **Ahmad helped enable bin Laden to be protected when he was plotting the Sept. 11 attacks by supporting the Taliban**. But she said Ahmad had no knowledge of the plot and there was no evidence he supported bin Laden's al-Qaida terrorist group.

#### This man helped protect Al Qaeda when it was planning the attacks on 9/11. He was just helping protect Al Qaeda, right? They were in need of protection, and he only helped them, right? This is what the affirmative wants to happen. Therefore we must not pass the plan.

**Craven 2014** (Jayne, an internationally-recognized consultant, researcher and trainer; work is focused on communications, volunteer involvement, community engagement, and management for nonprofits, NGOs, and government initiatives, “Volunteering to Help After Major Disasters,” http://www.coyotecommunications.com/stuff/vols\_in\_disasters.html)

But what most of these people don't realize is that spontaneous **volunteers** without *specific* training and no affiliation **can** actually **cause more problems** than they alleviate in a disaster situation, particularly regarding disaster locations far from their home. Consider this:

In many post-disaster situations, there is NO food, shelter, services or gas to spare for volunteers. Many volunteers going into the Philippines, Pakistan, Haiti, Japan, even the Gulf Coast states in the USA after Katrina or states affected by Sandy, had to be absolutely self-sustaining for many, many days, even many weeks. **No shelter or safety measures could be provided to** these **volunteers by the government. Those volunteers who weren't self-sustaining created big problems.**

**In disaster situations, you are going to be encountering disaster victims. They are going to be stressed, maybe desperate, and maybe angry. As a trained volunteer or paid staff member working with a credible organization, you are going to know how to comfort these people and direct them to where they can get assistance, and how to convince them that you have to save this person over here instead of their relative over there. If you are untrained and unaffiliated, you may become a target of their anger, because you cannot provide them with appropriate assistance, or because you provide them with incorrect information.**

**In disaster situations, volunteers must be mentally and physically prepared to work 16 hour days (or more) in highly-stressful situations where their own basic needs (like going to the bathroom) must be kept to a minimum. They may have to live in austere conditions, sleeping in a tent (that they must bring themselves) or a gymnasium with dozens, even hundreds, of other people, and using a very rustic latrine. And what happens if you get to the situation and discover you cannot handle what's happening around you, such as a riot, or a medical situation, or an armed group that shows up to rob you, or an illness of your own? Volunteers who show up, unaffiliated, untrained and not self-sufficient get in the way rather than helping, and take precious resources from those who have been devastated in a disaster situation.**

#### If you help others, there is always a chance of harming yourself.

#### This is an example:

**Dininny 2013** (Shannon, writer at Associated Press, “Mount Rainer makes changes after ranger’s deadly fall,” http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Mount-Rainier-makes-changes-after-rangers-deadly-fall-210131981.html)

**Nick Hall**, 33, **fell** about 2,400 feet **to his death** on the mountain's icy, exposed Emmons Glacier **while helping** to **rescue four injured climbers** from Waco, Texas, on June 21, 2012. Hall was a four-year climbing ranger originally from Patten, Maine.

This shows that by helping others even from a logical standpoint, people will still die. Many more people would end up dying as well due to joining to be a park ranger or other things of the sort because they were trying to be a person who helps others. In order for this not to happen, people must not help others even from a logical standpoint.

## Constructive 7

*“Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. It is not a triumphant power...it is a modest, suspicious power, which functions as a calculated, but permanent economy.”*

**― Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1975**

It is because I agree with Foucault, that I negate the resolution that Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

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I would like to start off by defining the following terms:

**Individual,** July 19, "Individual," <http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/individual>

**Moral Permissability,** July 21, "Definition of Morally Permissible?," <http://www.ask.com/question/definition-of-morally-permissible>

* **"Individual" is defined by MacMillan Dictionary as** - "a person unusual or different from anyone or anything else." An individual is someone who is in control of their actions. They are independent and can do as they wish.
* **"Moral Permissability" is defined by Dictionary.com as** - "that can be permitted; allowable". Moral permissability is when an action is not really approved or forbidden by a moral code. It allows people the a freedom of choice.

To make sure that the moral obligation is met, society will make it a part of social discipline. This a bad thing, because the discipline can be used to encourage anything, and through the power of suggestion, can be used to manipulate the people.

#### O'Farrell 2010 explains that discipline is...

Claire **O'Farrell**. [Philosopher]. "Key Concepts,". June 30, **2010**, <http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/#discipline>

* "Discipline" is **defined by Michel Foucault as** - Discipline is **a mechanism** of power **which regulates the behavior of individuals** in the social body. **This is done by regulating** the organisation of space (architecture etc.), of time (timetables) and **people's activity and behaviour** (drills, posture, movement). **It is enforced [by the society or government]** with the aid of complex systems of surveillance. Foucault emphasizes that power is not discipline, rather discipline is simply one way in which power can be exercised. **He also uses the term 'disciplinary society', discussing its history and the origins and disciplinary institutions such as prisons, hospitals, asylums, schools and army barracks. Foucault also specifies that when he speaks of a 'disciplinary society' he does not mean a 'disciplined society'.**

**A "disciplinary society" is different from a "disciplined society" in the way that in a "disciplinary society", society is enforcing the discipline through the use of scare tactics, intimidation, and displays of power . A "disciplined society" has a set discipline to maintain order and is not enforced through fear, but rather through encouragement and reward for actions.**

**In history, disciplinary societies are much more common and they were set up with the best of intentions. One include "Committee of Public Safety" set up during the French Revolution. They were set up to protect people from Counter-Revolutionaries, but soon switched to killing people who didn't agree with them. The affirmattive might say that what they say will make a disciplined society, but more likely than not will be a disciplinary one, because history is not on their side and it is likely that the ones in power will abuse it to their benefit.**

**I now offer the Disadvantage**

#### A) The status quo is one that is ruled by moral permissability. If you look at the news and media, it is deemed permissable to help people but they do not persecute people who do not as it recognizes their position and the dilemmas that they must have felt. This occured when in 9/11, the fire fighters had the moral OBLIGATION to save everyone, but there was no way that could happen and they saved some people in the end. According to moral obligation, their failure is immoral. But in moral permissability, it is allowed.

#### B) The enforcement of moral obligation creates a uniform set of morals that individuals cannot go against because they are social norms. Those that do oppose it are ostracized because the rest of society deems them unfit to function in society. This creates a uniform society that lacks individuality because the moral obligation tells people to follow the same set of morals, to do things that are not necessarily in their best interest, and takes away free will in most regards, leaving illusions of righteousness and independence. The best way to present this is to show the amount of defamation happens to people that aren't approved by society.

**Ostracism and Defamation.** Howard C. **Anawalt.**[Professor Emeritus at Santa Clara University School of Law]."Ostracism and the law of defamation", **2002**

**In** modern **society we "ostracize," [people]** but in a more informal sense. If we say that someone is **Being ostracized**, we simply **mean(s) that he or she is being shunned or avoided**. **A person who has** acquired **a bad reputation is likely to be ostracized or shunned** in modern days. The impact is not the same as ancient ostracism; one need not pack one's bags and leave for l0 years. **The blows received by** virtue of **a "bad reputation" may** nevertheless **be severe**. **One may be denied a job, refused a promotion, and excluded from very important opportunities.**

**B (Cont.)**

**Disciplinary Control** SCP, July 22, (Gary **Gutting**, **2013**, "Michel Foucault," <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/#4.4>)

**A distinctive feature of modern power (disciplinary control) is its concern with what people have not done (nonobservence), with, that is, a person's failure to reach required standards.** This concern illustrates the primary function of modern disciplinary systems: to correct deviant behavior. The goal is not revenge (as in the case of the tortures of premodern punishment) but reform, where, of course, reform means coming to live by society's standards or norms**. Discipline through imposing precise norms (“normalization”) is quite different from the older system of judicial punishment, which merely judges each action as allowed by the law or not allowed by the law and does not say that those judged are “normal” or “abnormal”.** This idea of normalization is pervasive in our society: e.g., national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products

**There are many examples through out history showing when society worked to weed out the abnormal using immoral techniques in the name of morality.**

**So the "moral" society that is promoted by the Affirmative actually creates an immoral world. That makes the solution that the Affirmative porposes is a no solvency.**

#### C) This creates an odd version of a surveillence state, however with society spying on itself rather than the government spying on society. It will keep the populace in check through the use of forced moral decisions. This takes away an individual's autonomy in the name of "morality". The autonomy is the basis of society, but if that is taken away, society ceases to function properly.

**Autonomy.** Jong S. **Jun.**"The Need for A­­­utonomy and Virtues: Civic-Minded Administrators in a Civil Society", **1999**

In liberalism**, the idea of the morally (and economically) autonomous individual serves as the basis of civil society and as the fundamental premise of political life**. **Liberal thought promoting the autonomous individual, described by such thinkers as David Hume (1911/1739), Forber (1975), Adam Smith (1966/1853), and Immanuel Kant (1956) emphasizes the private sphere**, in which civil society has no intrinsic meaning. **They insist that ethical value is determined by the individual and not by society. Because the individual is the originator of value, what is good is whatever is useful in meeting the ends of an individual**.

**Now on the case. No Solvency: This society is not a better society. This society that follows the plan laid out by the Affirmative not only does not improve the world, it turns it for the worse. This is because in the society painted by the affirmative, is oppressive and controlling in the name of rightousness and presumes itself to be the perfect moral society. However this ignores the glaring problem of forcing people to do anything, right or wrong. All it cares about is making "moral obligations" normal.**

**Normalization.** Gary.B. **Mesibov.** "Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1990", **1990**

**When dealing with a population as large and diverse as we have in America, the concept of what is normal becomes elusive at best.** **Given our population of over 200 million citizens,** it is possible to find some who are old and some who are young, some who are living in cities and some living in the country, some rigorously following religious teachings with others disavowing all religious activities, and so forth. Out of this diversity **the followers of the normalization principle have determined somehow that certain practices fit what is normal in our society whereas others do not.** When the issue was whether or not to institutionalize, the decision was fairly simple and straightforward, acknowledging that most handicapped people should live in the community. However, as our service delivery system became more complex so did the choices. The unfortunate consequence of these changes is that the limited value system of the proponents of normalization has become the criteria by which community-based programs are judged. For example, there seems to be a bias favoring more urban-type environments, making group homes close to bus lines in cities the most accepted practice. On the other hand, communitybased programs in the country are viewed as less desirable because of their relative isolation, distance from population centers, and lack of public transportation. To argue that these are less normal environments is a bit presumptuous, especially in states like North Carolina, South Dakota, Idaho, or Nebraska, where more rural life-styles are the norm rather than the exception. **It also uses a narrow concept of what is normal to determine the appropriateness of living environments for developmentally handicapped people. In addition to establishing criteria that are vague and elusive, normalization represents a goal that is, in most cases, unattainable.** Although most of us in the field of developmental disabilities are impressed with the progress handicapped people can make in nurturing environments, we are also realistic in acknowledging that their organic problems place some limitations on their overall functioning, even in ideal circumstances. This is, of course, why our system of special services has developed and is the justification for the existence of special educational and governmental programs. Although this statement might sound like heresy to some, it is no different from acknowledging that someone with average athletic ability cannot become a professional basketball player or that someone with an average intellect will not become a Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry.

**So the Affirmative's goal is unattainable and therefore the Affirmative position should not even be considered because not only is it immoral, it also is impossible.**

**Instead, as the Negative I say that the moral obligation should not be something to base decisions on, instead base it off of moral permissability. Moral permissability is a much better tool to make to decisions off of because it is dynamic and allows free will to occur. Moral obligation on the other hand is rigid and unchanging; it allows no free will because it explains that you HAVE to do it. This allows no choice and could be pave the way to an authoritarian regime that is morally "justified". And also my position of moral permissability does not demand impossible normalization and conformity, instead it asks for people to be reasonable and think before thir actions. So vote Neg.**